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Homework 10
Trainee's translation
It is not only an Arab phenomenon that middle classes support authoritarianism and abandon the demand for rights and freedoms in the stages of societal change and moments of popular movements. The Arab middle classes participated extensively in the Arab Spring uprisings of 2011, and in their aftermath sympathized with the democratic idea that linked the uprisings to building new political and social systems, modernizing national state institutions, and advocating the rotation of power through competitive elections. Then middle class Arabs in Egypt, Syria, Libya, Yemen, and even Tunisia turned against all that, embraced the withdrawal from the democratic attempt and encouraged the reversion to individual rule, with some of them justifying wide grievances and violations.
With such choices, the Arab middle classes did not differ from the middle classes in many Latin American societies in the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s, with their transition from demanding democracy and free elections to supporting military coups, abolition of politics, suppression of civil society, and dominance of security and intelligence agencies becoming a major reason for delaying the democratic transition in countries such as Brazil, Argentina, Chile, and others.
Arab middle classes, with such choices, did not differ from middle classes in some of the Asian societies such as Malaysia and Indonesia. The democratic transition there has been delayed for a long time by middle-class citizens. They kept swinging on the one hand between little demand for rights, freedoms, and the rule of law in periods of economic growth and improvement in basic services and living conditions, and on the other hand a reversion to the search for a savior dictator and the abandonment of parliaments, parliamentary governments and independent judicial authorities, towards the support of individual rule in periods of economic downturn. The choices of the Arab middle classes almost match with the current preferences of the middle class in Thailand, for example, which was pushed by the repeated electoral victories of partisan and political forces representing the poor, the marginalized and rural classes to abandon their demand for democracy and support military interventions in politics to dismiss elected prime ministers, disrupt parliamentary life, and cancel the policy of enabling military councils to seize power and declare martial law.
Rephrase:
It is not only an Arab phenomenon that middle classes support authoritarianism and abandon the demand for rights and freedoms in the stages of societal change and moments of popular movements. The Arab middle classes participated extensively in the Arab Spring uprisings of 2011, and in their aftermath sympathized with the democratic idea that linked the uprisings to building new political and social systems, modernizing national state institutions, and advocating the rotation of power through competitive elections. Then middle class Arabs in Egypt, Syria, Libya, Yemen, and even Tunisia turned against all that, embraced the withdrawal from the democratic attempt and encouraged the reversion to individual rule, with some of them justifying wide grievances and violations.
With such choices, the Arab middle classes did not differ from the middle classes in many Latin American societies in the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s, with their transition from demanding democracy and free elections to supporting military coups, abolition of politics, suppression of civil society, and dominance of security and intelligence agencies becoming a major reason for delaying the democratic transition in countries such as Brazil, Argentina, Chile, and others.
Arab middle classes, with such choices, did not differ from middle classes in some of the Asian societies such as Malaysia and Indonesia. The democratic transition there has been delayed for a long time by middle-class citizens. They kept swinging on the one hand between little demand for rights, freedoms, and the rule of law in periods of economic growth and improvement in basic services and living conditions, and on the other hand a reversion to the search for a savior dictator and the abandonment of parliaments, parliamentary governments and independent judicial authorities, towards the support of individual rule in periods of economic downturn. The choices of the Arab middle classes almost match with the current preferences of the middle class in Thailand, for example, which was pushed by the repeated electoral victories of partisan and political forces representing the poor, the marginalized and rural classes to abandon their demand for democracy and support military interventions in politics to dismiss elected prime ministers, disrupt parliamentary life, and cancel the policy of enabling military councils to seize power and declare martial law.
Second version
It is not only a phenomenon found in Arab countries that middle classes support authoritarianism and abandon their demands for fundamental human rights and freedoms during times of social change and popular movements. After participating extensively in the Arab Spring uprising of 2011, the Arab middle classes sympathized with the democratic idea which linked the uprisings to establishing new political and social systems, modernizing national state institutions, and advocating a system of competitive elections for power rotation. Nevertheless, middle-class Arabs in Egypt, Syria, Libya, Yemen, and even Tunisia turned against all that, withdrew from democratic efforts, and embraced individual rule, sometimes even by justifying broad grievances and violations.
As a result of such choices, the Arab middle classes did not differ significantly from those of many Latin American societies in the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s. The political climate in this region changed dramatically from demanding free elections and democracy to supporting military coups, the abolition of politics, the suppression of civil society, and the dominance of security and intelligence agencies, all of which served as major obstacles delaying the democratic transition in countries like Brazil, Argentina, Chile, and others.
Similarly, this is true for middle classes in some Asian societies, such as Malaysia and Indonesia, where the transition to democracy was delayed for an extended period of time due to fluctuating middle class positions. The demand for rights, freedoms, and the rule of law has been low in periods of economic growth and improvement in basic services and living conditions. Nevertheless, in times of economic hardship, they turned again to the search for a savior dictator, abandoning parliaments, parliamentary governments, and independent judicial authorities in favor of individual rule. Middle-class preferences in the Arab world are almost identical to those in Thailand today, for example. The repeated electoral victories of political parties and groups representing the poor, the marginalized, and the rural classes encouraged middle class citizens to abandon their demands for democracy. It appears that they support military interventions in politics in order to dismiss elected prime ministers, disrupt parliamentary debates, and abolish policies that enable military councils to seize power and declare martial law.
Trainer's translation
It is not unique to the Arab world that the middle class recoils from demanding rights and freedoms in the midst of social change and popular uprisings. A significant number of Arab middle classes were involved in the Arab spring uprisings of 2012. Moreover, they were sympathetic to the democratic notions that arose during the aftermath of the uprising, including the establishment of new political and societal systems, modernizing national institutions of the state, and promoting the delegation of power through competitive elections. Within a short period of time, Arab middle classers in Egypt, Syria, Libya, Yemen, even in Tunisia, adopted an opposite position, withdrawing from the democratic process and advocating a return to autocracy. In some cases, they even devolved into hysteria over defending grievances and large-scale violations.
These choices were similar to those of the middle classes in many Latin American countries during the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s. In countries such as Brazil, Argentina, Chile, and others, the middle classes' shift from demanding democracy and free elections to supporting military coups, abolishing politics, suppressing civil society, and becoming overly dependent on the security and intelligence services retarded the democratic transition.
A similar pattern can also be found in some Asian societies, such as Malaysia and Indonesia, whose democratic transformation has been disrupted for a long time due to the position middle classers have occupied, fluctuating between a demand for democracy, freedom, and the rule of law during economic growth and improvement of basic services and livelihoods, but then bouncing back to a search for a saviour dictator. The other end of the spectrum saw those in the middle class turning away from parliaments, parliamentarian governments, and independent judiciaries toward a preference for autocracy during difficult economic times. Almost identical choices are made by the Arab middle class to those made by their Thai counterparts, where, for example, parties and political powers representing poor, impoverished and rural populations have consistently won elections. Middle classers have given up on their demands for democracy to support, instead, the interference of the army in politics to depose elected leaders, disrupt parliament, and undermine politics. During this period, military councils were enabled to seize control of state government and declare martial law.
ليست ظاهرة عربية وحسب، أن تعمد الطبقات الوسطى إلى تأييد السلطوية والتخلي عن المطالبة بالحقوق والحريات في مراحل التغيير المجتمعي ولحظات الحراك الشعبي. شاركت الطبقات الوسطى العربية بكثافة في انتفاضات الربيع العربي 2011، وتعاطفت في أعقابها مع الفكرة الديمقراطية التي ربطت بين الانتفاضات وبين بناء نظم سياسية واجتماعية جديدة وتحديث مؤسسات الدولة الوطنية وتداول السلطة عبر انتخابات تنافسية. ثم سرعان ما انقلب عرب الطبقات الوسطى في مصر وسوريا وليبيا واليمن، بل وفي تونس، على كل ذلك وتبنوا الانسحاب من المحاولة الديمقراطية وشجعوا الارتداد إلى حكم الفرد وتماهى بعضهم مع هيستيريا تبرير المظالم والانتهاكات الواسعة.
باختياراتها هذه، لم تختلف الطبقات الوسطى العربية عن الطبقات الوسطى في العديد من مجتمعات أمريكا اللاتينية في ستينيات وسبعينيات وثمانينيات القرن العشرين حيث كان انتقالها من المطالبة بالديمقراطية والانتخابات الحرة إلى دعم الانقلابات العسكرية وإلغاء السياسة وقمع المجتمع المدني وسطوة الأجهزة الأمنية والاستخباراتية سببا رئيسيا في تأخر التحول الديمقراطي في بلدان مثل البرازيل والأرجنتين وشيلي وغيرها.
لم تختلف الطبقات الوسطى العربية في اختياراتها هذه عن الطبقات الوسطى في بعض المجتمعات الآسيوية كماليزيا وإندونيسيا، وبهما عطل التحول الديمقراطي طويلا بسبب مراوحة مواطني الطبقات الوسطى بين القليل من طلب الحقوق والحريات وسيادة القانون في فترات النمو الاقتصادي وتحسن الخدمات الأساسية والظروف المعيشية وبين الارتداد إلى البحث عن ديكتاتور منقذ وإلى هجر البرلمانات والحكومات البرلمانية والسلطات القضائية المستقلة باتجاه تأييد حكم الفرد في فترات التراجع الاقتصادي. بل أن اختيارات الطبقات الوسطى العربية تكاد تتطابق مع التفضيلات الراهنة للطبقة الوسطى في تايلاند على سبيل المثال التي دفعتها الانتصارات الانتخابية المتكررة لقوى حزبية وسياسية تمثل الطبقات الفقيرة والمهمشة والريفية إلى التخلي عن مطالبتها بالديمقراطية وتأييد تدخلات الجيش في السياسة لعزل رؤساء وزراء منتخبين وتعطيل الحياة البرلمانية وإلغاء السياسة تمكين مجالس عسكرية من السيطرة على الحكم وإعلان الأحكام العرفية.
Trainee's translation
It is not only an Arab phenomenon that middle classes support authoritarianism and abandon the demand for rights and freedoms in the stages of societal change and moments of popular movements. The Arab middle classes participated extensively in the Arab Spring uprisings of 2011, and in their aftermath sympathized with the democratic idea that linked the uprisings to building new political and social systems, modernizing national state institutions, and advocating the rotation of power through competitive elections. Then middle class Arabs in Egypt, Syria, Libya, Yemen, and even Tunisia turned against all that, embraced the withdrawal from the democratic attempt and encouraged the reversion to individual rule, with some of them justifying wide grievances and violations.
With such choices, the Arab middle classes did not differ from the middle classes in many Latin American societies in the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s, with their transition from demanding democracy and free elections to supporting military coups, abolition of politics, suppression of civil society, and dominance of security and intelligence agencies becoming a major reason for delaying the democratic transition in countries such as Brazil, Argentina, Chile, and others.
Arab middle classes, with such choices, did not differ from middle classes in some of the Asian societies such as Malaysia and Indonesia. The democratic transition there has been delayed for a long time by middle-class citizens. They kept swinging on the one hand between little demand for rights, freedoms, and the rule of law in periods of economic growth and improvement in basic services and living conditions, and on the other hand a reversion to the search for a savior dictator and the abandonment of parliaments, parliamentary governments and independent judicial authorities, towards the support of individual rule in periods of economic downturn. The choices of the Arab middle classes almost match with the current preferences of the middle class in Thailand, for example, which was pushed by the repeated electoral victories of partisan and political forces representing the poor, the marginalized and rural classes to abandon their demand for democracy and support military interventions in politics to dismiss elected prime ministers, disrupt parliamentary life, and cancel the policy of enabling military councils to seize power and declare martial law.
Rephrase:
It is not only an Arab phenomenon that middle classes support authoritarianism and abandon the demand for rights and freedoms in the stages of societal change and moments of popular movements. The Arab middle classes participated extensively in the Arab Spring uprisings of 2011, and in their aftermath sympathized with the democratic idea that linked the uprisings to building new political and social systems, modernizing national state institutions, and advocating the rotation of power through competitive elections. Then middle class Arabs in Egypt, Syria, Libya, Yemen, and even Tunisia turned against all that, embraced the withdrawal from the democratic attempt and encouraged the reversion to individual rule, with some of them justifying wide grievances and violations.
With such choices, the Arab middle classes did not differ from the middle classes in many Latin American societies in the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s, with their transition from demanding democracy and free elections to supporting military coups, abolition of politics, suppression of civil society, and dominance of security and intelligence agencies becoming a major reason for delaying the democratic transition in countries such as Brazil, Argentina, Chile, and others.
Arab middle classes, with such choices, did not differ from middle classes in some of the Asian societies such as Malaysia and Indonesia. The democratic transition there has been delayed for a long time by middle-class citizens. They kept swinging on the one hand between little demand for rights, freedoms, and the rule of law in periods of economic growth and improvement in basic services and living conditions, and on the other hand a reversion to the search for a savior dictator and the abandonment of parliaments, parliamentary governments and independent judicial authorities, towards the support of individual rule in periods of economic downturn. The choices of the Arab middle classes almost match with the current preferences of the middle class in Thailand, for example, which was pushed by the repeated electoral victories of partisan and political forces representing the poor, the marginalized and rural classes to abandon their demand for democracy and support military interventions in politics to dismiss elected prime ministers, disrupt parliamentary life, and cancel the policy of enabling military councils to seize power and declare martial law.
Second version
It is not only a phenomenon found in Arab countries that middle classes support authoritarianism and abandon their demands for fundamental human rights and freedoms during times of social change and popular movements. After participating extensively in the Arab Spring uprising of 2011, the Arab middle classes sympathized with the democratic idea which linked the uprisings to establishing new political and social systems, modernizing national state institutions, and advocating a system of competitive elections for power rotation. Nevertheless, middle-class Arabs in Egypt, Syria, Libya, Yemen, and even Tunisia turned against all that, withdrew from democratic efforts, and embraced individual rule, sometimes even by justifying broad grievances and violations.
As a result of such choices, the Arab middle classes did not differ significantly from those of many Latin American societies in the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s. The political climate in this region changed dramatically from demanding free elections and democracy to supporting military coups, the abolition of politics, the suppression of civil society, and the dominance of security and intelligence agencies, all of which served as major obstacles delaying the democratic transition in countries like Brazil, Argentina, Chile, and others.
Similarly, this is true for middle classes in some Asian societies, such as Malaysia and Indonesia, where the transition to democracy was delayed for an extended period of time due to fluctuating middle class positions. The demand for rights, freedoms, and the rule of law has been low in periods of economic growth and improvement in basic services and living conditions. Nevertheless, in times of economic hardship, they turned again to the search for a savior dictator, abandoning parliaments, parliamentary governments, and independent judicial authorities in favor of individual rule. Middle-class preferences in the Arab world are almost identical to those in Thailand today, for example. The repeated electoral victories of political parties and groups representing the poor, the marginalized, and the rural classes encouraged middle class citizens to abandon their demands for democracy. It appears that they support military interventions in politics in order to dismiss elected prime ministers, disrupt parliamentary debates, and abolish policies that enable military councils to seize power and declare martial law.
Trainer's translation
It is not unique to the Arab world that the middle class recoils from demanding rights and freedoms in the midst of social change and popular uprisings. A significant number of Arab middle classes were involved in the Arab spring uprisings of 2012. Moreover, they were sympathetic to the democratic notions that arose during the aftermath of the uprising, including the establishment of new political and societal systems, modernizing national institutions of the state, and promoting the delegation of power through competitive elections. Within a short period of time, Arab middle classers in Egypt, Syria, Libya, Yemen, even in Tunisia, adopted an opposite position, withdrawing from the democratic process and advocating a return to autocracy. In some cases, they even devolved into hysteria over defending grievances and large-scale violations.
These choices were similar to those of the middle classes in many Latin American countries during the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s. In countries such as Brazil, Argentina, Chile, and others, the middle classes' shift from demanding democracy and free elections to supporting military coups, abolishing politics, suppressing civil society, and becoming overly dependent on the security and intelligence services retarded the democratic transition.
A similar pattern can also be found in some Asian societies, such as Malaysia and Indonesia, whose democratic transformation has been disrupted for a long time due to the position middle classers have occupied, fluctuating between a demand for democracy, freedom, and the rule of law during economic growth and improvement of basic services and livelihoods, but then bouncing back to a search for a saviour dictator. The other end of the spectrum saw those in the middle class turning away from parliaments, parliamentarian governments, and independent judiciaries toward a preference for autocracy during difficult economic times. Almost identical choices are made by the Arab middle class to those made by their Thai counterparts, where, for example, parties and political powers representing poor, impoverished and rural populations have consistently won elections. Middle classers have given up on their demands for democracy to support, instead, the interference of the army in politics to depose elected leaders, disrupt parliament, and undermine politics. During this period, military councils were enabled to seize control of state government and declare martial law.
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